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Abstract 
This paper argues that the growth performance of the Indian economy, while 
commendable by the standards of the pre reform period, is not adequate to rid India of the 
bane of poverty in a short enough time period.  Two reasons are identified for this 
inadequate growth performance viz., low rate of savings and investment and poor 
productivity of public sector investments. The paper then discusses the design of fiscal 
policy to help raise the rate of saving and investment and improve the productivity of 
public expenditures.   
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“There are only three gems in the world – water, foodgrain and beneficial 
advice. Some misled men, however, think of pieces of stones as gems” 
     Kautilya in Arthashastra 
I. Introduction  
If, at this point in time early in the new millennium, one had to single out the most 
important task before economic administrators in India that task must be to raise the rate 
of economic growth. Once the reforms began, GDP growth rates did pick up for a while 
in the mid 1990s but have since settled down to the narrow band of 5.5 to 6.5%. There 
are fears now that this rate could fall even lower during 2001-02. At this rate, the Indian 
economy will take an unacceptably long time to get rid of its bane of poverty. In the post 
reforms period although poverty seems to have declined particularly in the urban sector, 
the rural sector picture remains considerably disappointing1.  
It is also important to remember that such growth as exists is largely driven by 
good performance of the services sector with a commensurate rise in the share of services 
in GDP (now standing at more than 50% of GDP). The share of manufacturing sector in 
GDP has been stagnant at a level slightly more than half that in China’s.  The Indian 
economy thus seems to have gone through a typical transition associated with economic 
development – the share of GDP originating in industry falling as the share of output 
from services rises - without the share of manufacturing sector in GDP ever reaching the 
level it has attained in major economies around the world.  The aggregate growth 
performance, although impressive by India’s past performance is simply inadequate to 
address some of the long standing problems the country faces and, more importantly, is 
unnecessarily below potential.  
                                                               
1 See Dutt (1999) and Jha (2000), on this point. 
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The primary purpose of this is paper is to assess some dimensions of the role that 
fiscal policy can play in stimulating the rate growth of the Indian economy. Clearly the 
appropriate design of fiscal policy is important since fiscal policy could act both as a 
stimulant as well as an obstacle for rapid economic growth.  If tax and expenditure 
policies are geared towards encouraging savings and investment and the efficient use of 
capital fiscal policy can help stimulate economic growth.  However, fiscal policy can hurt 
prospects for economic growth if, for example, profligate government machinery runs up 
successively high budget deficits and crowds out productive private investment.   
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section II I outline two dominant reasons 
for the inadequate growth performance of the Indian economy.  Section III discusses 
some policy options at the central and lower levels of government to improve growth 
performance. Section IV concludes.  
II. Two reasons for the inadequate growth performance of India 
Several reasons have been discussed in the popular as well as the scholarly literature for 
the inadequate performance of the Indian economy. The most significant of these must be 
the low magnitude and poor performance of investment in India. So far as the former is 
concerned, an illustration is provided in Figure 1 where the Indian ratio of Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation to GDP is compared with that in China and Korea. Both these 
countries have had a better investment performance than India’s. Since 1992 the Chinese 
investment to GDP rate has been higher by 10 percentage points or more than India’s. 
The Korean investment to GDP rate has also been higher by 10 percentage points or more 
except for the “crisis period” since 1997. If one were to argue that the productivity of 
capital is approximately the same in China, India and Korea it should not surprise us that 
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the trend rate of growth rate in these economies has been higher than that in India.  In fact 
the relative GDP growth performance of these economies has quite accurately mirrored 
the differences in investment rates with Indian GDP growth rates in India in the 1990s 
being 90% or lower of the GDP growth rates in China, for example.  
 
Stagnation in investments explains much of India’s disappointing GDP 
growth in recent years. Inadequate resources accompany weak demand for asset creation, 
as savings have tended to stagnate and even drop in the recent past. Unless the demand 
for asset (i.e. productive investment) is accompanied by a rise in resources (savings and 
FDI) India’s GDP growth would stay well below the targeted 7%. The rate of gross 
capital formation fell from 26.9% of GDP in 1995-96to 23.3% in 1999-00. This chopped 
Figure 1
Investment Rates in India, China, Japan and Korea
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off almost one per cent from real GDP growth.  At the same time domestic savings rate 
has dropped to close to 22% of GDP, entirely on account of government dis-saving and 
lower savings of the private corporate sector. That, coupled with meagre FDI inflows, 
deprives the economy of sufficient resources to augment investment.   
 According to some commentators, the industrial sector and manufacturing 
companies drove the first wave of asset creation in the mid-1990s. Now, corporates are 
focused less on asset creation and more on extracting value from past investments.  
Achieving the targeted 7% GDP growth would need investment of US$140bn in 2002-03 
US$20bn more than expected given the current investment rate. A shortfall of US$20bn 
would eventually cap GDP growth at the 6% level. 
Where could this additional investment be absorbed? In terms of the sectoral 
picture, while infrastructure sectors have the potential to absorb large investment, 
obstacles in the policy framework persist. Telecom sector looks promising and to a lesser 
extent, roads. However, the power sector remains in deep trouble with no end in sight.  
The corporate sector does not seem to be in any position to absorb such large increases in 
investment.  
In terms of domestic savings supply, the household sector looks the most 
promising.  The cumulative asset growth rate for the household sector nearly doubled 
from 8.9% in the first half of the 1990s to 18.8% in the latter half.  Thus policy efforts 
should be directed to increase household savings. Part of this would be through tax 
policies, discussed below and part through stimuli in critical sectors such as housing. FDI 
investment in India is still very poor in comparison both to China, other developing 
countries as well as in comparison to India’s potential (Table 1). The fraction of gross 
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fixed capital formation financed by FDI is smaller in India than in smaller neighboring 
countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
 
 
Table 1 
US$ million                      FDI Inflows into select Asian economies 1989-2000 
Country  1989-94 
average 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Bangladesh 6 2 14 141 190 179 170 
China 13951 35849 40180 44237 43751 40319 40772 
Hong Kong  4164 6213 10480 11368 14776 24591 64448 
India 394 2144 2591 3613 2614 2154 2315 
Indonesia  1524 4346 6194 4677 -356 -2745 -4540 
South Korea  869 1776 2325 2844 5412 10598 10186 
Malaysia 3964 5916 7296 6513 2700 3532 5542 
Pakistan 304 719 918 713 507 531 308 
Philippines 879 1459 1520 1249 1752 737 1489 
Singapore  4798 8788 10372 12967 6316 7197 6390 
Sri Lanka  102 65 133 435 206 177 217 
Thailand 1927 2004 2271 3627 5143 3562 2448 
Vietnam 651 2336 2519 2824 2254 1991 2081 
Sub total 33533 71517 86793 95208 85625 92823 131816 
Region 35078 73639 89846 98507 86004 96224 137348 
FDI Inflows as percentage of gross fixed Capital Formation in select Asian 
economies 1989-2000 
 
Country  1989-94 
average 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  
Bangladesh n.a. n.a n.a 2.9 3.8 3.2  
China 7.9 14.7 14.3 14.6 12.9 11.3  
Hong Kong  14.8 14.6 21.7 19.8 29.9 60.2  
India 0.6 2.4 2.9 3.8 2.9 2.4  
Indonesia  4.0 7.6 9.2 7.7 -1.6 -11.0  
South Korea  0.8 1.0 1.2 1.7 5.7 9.3  
Malaysia 19.4 15.0 17.0 15.1 13.9 20.1  
Pakistan 3.7 7.1 8.9 7.3 5.7 6.5  
Philippines 7.5 8.9 7.8 6.2 12.7 5.1  
Singapore  30.3 31.2 29.7 35.3 20.6 26.1  
Sri Lanka 4.2 1.9 4.0 11.8 5.2 4.1  
Thailand 5.0 2.9 3.0 7.2 20.7 13.7  
Region 5.9 8.2 9.1 10.1 10.4 11.2  
Source: World Investment Report, 2001 
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Hence the first order of business in boosting the growth rate of the Indian 
economy has to be a boosting of the rate of investment. What role can fiscal policy play 
in accomplishing this? Addressing this question is one of the principal objectives of this 
paper.  We will, however, not comment upon the measures needed to boost FDI.  
Another prime candidate as an explanation for inadequate growth performance of 
the Indian economy is the (legendary) poor productivity of public expenditure in India. 
The seeds of such poor productivity are embedded in the very philosophy behind such 
expenditures.  Public expenditure management systems in India have emphasized control 
and ignored achievement and have often served as avenues of easy and steady 
employment for many. As a consequence, government departments and programs have 
tended to expand uncontrollably irrespective of any rationale for their existence. Highly 
centralized2 decision-making and control systems have left bureaucrats unable to take 
initiatives to secure improved results even when they wished to do so. Hence, the public 
service has settled into a low-level equilibrium, in which low expectations, the dead 
weight of bureaucracy, lack of incentives, accountability and political interference 
combine to generate low performance, high waste and corruption. In the Indian case, this 
is typified by a high incidence of failure of public expenditure across the board: from 
large-scale public sector white-elephant type investments to anti-poverty programs that 
do not reach the poor.  Some of the public expenditure being addressed here belongs to 
the category of investment expenditure. This fact then reinforces the tendency for GDP 
growth rates to be below potential in India3.  Later in this paper I explore some avenues 
                                                               
2 Gordon and Wilson (2001) have argued that expenditure competition among state governments in a 
federal framework reduces waste and encourages efficiency.  
3 It is implicitly assumed here that the productivity of private investment expenditure in India is comparable 
to those in rapidly growing economies of East Asia. This may not be an entirely valid assumption – 
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for reform of public expenditure in order to enhance its productivity.  
III. Fiscal Policy for Higher Economic Growth 
Mirroring the low rate of investment in India is her low savings rate. The highest that the 
savings rate of the Indian economy has ever attained is 25.46% of GDP compared to an 
excess of 30% in several East Asian countries.  In only three years since the reforms 
began has the savings rate been in excess of 24% of GDP. Higher investment rates are 
possible only if the savings rate goes up substantially or foreign savings (current account 
deficits) are used in a big way to supplement domestic savings. The latter course of action 
is ruled out in view of the East Asian currency crisis of the late 1990s. As is well known 
countries like Thailand, Indonesia and others ran high current account deficits 
(accumulated foreign savings). But this led to a lack of confidence in their currencies 
amounting to a run, in some cases.  Thus enhancing the growth rate of the Indian 
economy would necessarily call for higher domestic savings. In addition, fiscal policy 
can have a role in improving the productivity of investment.  
Empirical evidence on the determinants of effects of savings among a panel 
consisting of both developed and developing countries (including India) presented by 
Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (2000) indicates that most important determinant of 
savings is the level of per capita income and the rate of growth of the economy.  This 
effect is particularly strong in developing countries like India.  Thus raising the rate of 
savings and the rate of growth of the economy becomes a circular issue- the higher the 
rate of savings the higher the rate of growth of the economy and the higher the rate of 
growth the higher the rate of savings at least at low absolute levels of per capita income.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
however the paucity of investment coupled with the low productivity of public investment would appear to 
be sufficient explanation for inadequate growth in India.  
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Their results also point to the possibility of incomplete Ricardian Equivalence. In other 
words, a given rise in public savings is accompanied by a less than commensurate drop in 
private savings.  Had Ricardian equivalence obtained, consumers would realize that any 
increase in public expenditure would be paid for by taxes and adjust private saving 
commensurately. This is of obvious policy significance in the Indian context.   
Such empirical studies also point to the relevance of the gap between the real rate 
of return on savings and the discount rate. The role played by the characteristics of the 
credit market is crucial here. For instance, it has been discovered that savers who are 
liquidity constrained may be more sensitive to such differentials as opposed to those who 
do not face such constraints. As financial deepening takes place and fewer consumers 
remain liquidity constrained, this responsiveness may drop. However, it might also be the 
case that as consumers become less liquidity constrained they might become less risk 
averse and opt for investments with higher returns. This might help boost the rate of 
savings.  Thus the impact of the tax structure on savings is of critical importance.  A 
meaningful research agenda on stimulating saving must, therefore, concentrate on 
estimating effective tax rates4 (and implied net rates of return) for various sources of 
income as well as for different sectors. It would then be necessary to ensure the 
elimination of distorting differences in effective tax rates across sectors as well as assets.    
 Since the prime determinant of the saving rate appears to be the level and rate of 
growth of per capita income, all tax-induced distortions that create inefficiencies and 
lower the potential rate of economic growth should be eliminated. Thus there is urgent 
need for tax reforms. The basic tenets of tax reform are well known and far too elaborate 
for a complete analysis to be attempted here. (For a recent account see Jha (1999a)). 
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These are only briefly stated here and the performance of the Indian economy with 
respect to these is briefly assessed.  
An important canon of tax reform is that as an economy develops reliance on 
indirect taxation, as a source of revenue should decline. This is because indirect taxes 
typically have an excess burden (or deadweight losses) associated with them (Jha 1998, 
chapter 13). Furthermore efficient indirect taxation (one that minimizes excess burden to 
the representative consumer, for example) can be quite regressive5. One can make 
indirect taxes more progressive by sacrificing some amount of efficiency but the extent of 
the redistribution possible through such means is quite limited (Sah, 1983).   
This principle applies to indirect taxes that are differentiated and distortionary.  If, 
however, indirect taxes can be levied on final consumption alone it would be possible to 
avoid the tax-induced changes in relative prices that characterize production taxes such as 
excise duties. Then, if consumer utility functions are weakly separable between 
consumption and leisure, a uniform tax on final consumption goods (say a VAT or, in the 
case of India, a properly harmonized state and central VAT) would approximate a lump-
sum tax6. This would be a superior solution to distortionary commodity taxation.  It is 
implicitly understood that a proper VAT would replace the existing indirect tax structure.  
A related principle of tax reform is that the share of direct taxation in overall tax 
revenue should rise. Within direct taxation, reliance has to be shifted from corporate to 
income taxes.  Since corporate profits are taxed at the level of personal income anyway, 
the rationale for separate corporate taxes is rather weak. There are only two arguments 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 Jha and Mittal (1990) present some evidence on this. 
5 Efficient indirect taxation often calls for tax rates to very inversely with the compensated elasticity of 
demand. This would make them "regressive".  
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in favor of corporate taxes: i) as a tax on foreigners' incomes and ii) as a tax on 
noncompetitive profits7. Within the sphere of income taxation, the rate and exemptions 
structures need to be rationalized. Tax reform theory advocates taxation of "full income" 
the Haig-Simons definition of which is "all increases in human and physical capital 
during a period of time". One cannot pick and choose the types of income one would 
like to tax. This canon has, of course, been grossly violated in the Indian case with 
several categories of income exempt from income taxation.  
In line with the 'new' public economics of the Nobel laureates William Vickrey 
and James Mirrlees, the number of income tax brackets should be small, the degree of 
progression mild and the top marginal tax rate low.  These have been adhered to in the 
Indian tax reforms program.  However, an important canon of optimal direct taxation is 
also that there be few, if any income sources that are exempt from taxation.  In the 
Indian case this has not been adhered to.  Traditionally agricultural income has been tax 
exempt as are some sources of investment income. In addition, the ongoing process of 
globalization, which the economy is going through, creates its own avenues for tax 
exemptions.  
Globalization has followed liberalization. Now firms and individuals are freer to 
adopt global strategies. However, national governments must, perforce, think in terms of 
domestic allocation of resources, the national account books, increasing the domestic rate 
of growth, protecting the domestic poor and so on.  In this sense, the scope of activities of 
governments and those of the best and most dynamic firms and individuals are tending to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
6 Separability of the utility function between goods and leisure would indicate that taxation of goods would 
have no implications for the labor-leisure choice.  
7 In developing countries such as India, corporate tax rates are high essentially as a revenue raising 
measure. It is much harder to evade corporate as compared to income taxes.  
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divert from each other more than at any other time in the past.  The future has much more 
of this in store. Thus increased liberalization of financial markets has improved the 
international allocation of savings and reduced the cost of capital. But it has also widened 
the opportunities for tax evasion and avoidance.   
Globalization has provided several avenues for tax avoidance. The Economist 
(2000) reported, for example, that e-commerce amounted to about US$150 billion in 
1999, which would rise to more than US$3 trillion by 2003. Surely, if India were to 
remain in the vanguard of the information technology revolution, a significant share of 
such e-commerce would originate in India.  
Some have argued that it is best to leave out e-commerce from the tax net. It is a 
nascent industry, they argue, and taxing it would thwart its growth. Since India has 
discovered comparative advantage in IT, this reasoning is particularly valid for her. 
However, this argument is flawed. There is a rationale for zero customs duties on e-
commerce in line with arguments for free trade, but not for zero taxes. If goods traded 
through e-commerce were not taxed whereas goods traded through ordinary channels are 
this would be inefficient as well as inequitable. A commodity that is sold in a bricks and 
mortar store and, therefore, subject to taxation would be deemed to be different if sold 
through e-commerce and escape taxation. Further, those buying through e-commerce are 
likely to be the more affluent sections of society. This exacerbates inequity. Furthermore, 
a policy of not taxing e-commerce would provide another avenue for tax evasion. There 
is U.S. evidence to suggest that sales over the Internet are quite responsive to the failure 
to collect taxes.  Furthermore, given its projected phenomenal rate of growth, if e-
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commerce is not taxed there will be sharp erosion of the tax bases of governments that 
primarily levy sales taxes.  
It is well recognized that e-commerce presents some formidable challenges for tax 
administration. Both the origin as well as the destination principles of commodity 
taxation applied at the subnational level in a country such as India would find it hard to 
deal with e-commerce. With the physical location of both the buyer and the seller of the 
commodity in question irrelevant for the transaction, assigning tax liability would be 
hard. In addition, many goods (such as software) sold through e-commerce are directly 
downloaded and do not necessarily have a physical presence. 
Given the vast scale of anticipated e-commerce transactions, it can safely be said 
that the smaller the scale of government, the greater would be the difficulty of taxing e-
commerce. The central government with its reach throughout the country may find it 
easier to tax e-commerce than individual state governments, certainly local governments. 
This further centralization of tax authority and the continued need to further decentralize 
public expenditures would require the devolution of larger and larger funds to state 
governments. This would put greater stress on the structure of fiscal transfers 
necessitating a devolution plan that is transparent, fair and acceptable to all levels of 
government. This development is a further challenge to Indian federalism and requires 
urgent research attention from academics and policy makers8.   
Another source of worry is the presence of tax havens. The OECD estimates, for 
example, that during 1985-94 the foreign direct investment by the G7 countries in some 
tax havens in the Caribbean and South Pacific increased more than five fold to more than 
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US$ 200 billion – an increase well in excess of the growth of total outbound FDI.  These 
concerns extend to transition and developing economies including India. In some such 
situations what has been called “a race to the bottom” may ensue with national and/or 
state governments using tax incentives competitively to attract FDI. Such incentives then 
interact dynamically with the existing avenues for tax evasion (for example because 
considerable segments of income are not taxed as in India) to reduce not just current tax 
revenues but the prospects for higher future tax revenues. In the face of this tax reform, 
particularly direct tax reform should have a considerable element of international 
cooperation. But all we have are independent action or bilateral treaties. Direct tax reform 
in India must take cognizance of this lacuna.  
A related issue is that of the taxation of services. Services now constitute 52.3 per 
cent of GDP. Incomes from the service sector are taxed as income. However, whereas 
central excise and state sales taxes are levied on goods, services face very few indirect 
taxes. This is inefficient as well as inequitable. Inequitable because it discriminates 
between providers of goods and services; inefficient because it has the potential of 
creating several distortions thus increasing non-labor costs. It is not surprising, that the 
world over, growth in the most rapidly growing part of services (the so-called FIIRE 
sector of Finance, Insurance, Internet and Real Estate) creates the fewest jobs per unit of 
value added. It is for such reasons that major indirect tax reforms in recent times go under 
the rubric of goods and services tax reform. In the U.S., where state sales taxes have 
largely exempted services, there is evidence that the phenomenal growth of services is 
related to their non-taxation. A similar phenomenon is at work in India.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8 A further problem in the federal structure of India is the inadequate performance of the state governments 
with respect to tax effort. Jha et. al. (1999) discover that the higher the share of central financing of state 
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In terms of customs duties, tax reform theory calls for moving toward a free trade 
regime. These have typically involved replacing quantitative restrictions (broadly 
interpreted to include non-tariff barriers) with tariffs, reducing the mean and variance of 
tariffs and opening up domestic markets to foreign investment. In the Indian context 
some progress has been made in this regard, however, tariff levels in India are still much 
higher9 than Asian levels.  
Since indirect taxes are regressive and distortionary it is natural to seek a 
reduction in their importance in overall tax revenues.  For a developing country like India 
one could imagine that when per capita incomes are low the direct tax to GDP ratio 
would also be low. The per capita real Gross Domestic Product of the Indian economy as 
revealed by National Accounts Statistics has grown by about 2 per cent per annum 
between 1950-99, which would then imply that per capita output has grown by a factor of 
about 2.5 over the period 1950-99.  However, despite this not unsubstantial performance, 
the tax/GDP ratio has actually fallen and the share of direct taxes stagnated at best.  
Customs duties have come down recently but nevertheless, India's tax mix was probably 
better at the dawn of independence than it is now.  This is a serious indictment of tax 
design and administration in India.  
Poor tax performance and inelastic revenue requirements have meant that fiscal 
deficits have been high in the Indian context. This is true of both the central as well as the 
state governments.  The combined deficits of state and central governments have been 
high since the crisis year of 1991. Although the deficit of the central government fell in 
the early part of the structural adjustment period, some of this adjustment was done at the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
government expenditures the lower is their tax effort.    
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expense of transfers to state governments10. This information is presented in Figure 2. In 
the mid to late 1990s the fiscal deficit of the central government fell whereas that of the 
state governments went up.  
Bemoaning the fact that while the deficit of the central government fell that of the 
state governments increased, RBI (2000) noted:  
"The fiscal outcome … is essentially a reflection of the structural weakness of 
State finances. The revenue side is vulnerable to wide fluctuations either due to the 
constraint on the State Governments to generate adequate own resources or due to the 
variability in the vertical resource transfers, with the expenditures being inflexible to the 
revenue flows. This weakness often gets reflected in the form of the actual budgetary 
outcomes deviating from the initial projections of resources and expenditures. Such 
deviations bring to the fore the important issue of 'integrity of budgeting' or fiscal 
marksmanship of states." 
 
The high deficit of the state governments pushes up their borrowing requirements. 
Larger and larger portions of these borrowings are then used for consumption (servicing 
the debt) rather than for productive purposes.  In 1999-2000 the total debt of state 
governments crossed its upper limit of 20% (as decreed by the Constitution of India) of 
GDP11.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
9 Although quantitative restrictions on imports were lifted on April 1, 2001 pursuant to India’s agreements 
with the WTO, tariff levels have been raised in compensation.  
10 Another major component of the adjustment was reduction in capital expenditures by all levels of 
government.  
11 In addition, the structure of transfers from the central to the state governments is not encouraging higher 
tax effort by state governments. See Jha et. al. (1999).   Jha (1999b) examines sustainability of India’s 
internal debt.  
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Figure 2:
Combined Deficits of Central and State Governments
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(Figure 2 legend: GFD=gross fiscal deficit; GPD=gross primary deficit; RD=revenue deficit; 
RPD=Revenue Primary Deficit; OD=other deficit; monetized deficit). 
Fitting a linear trend to the combined fiscal deficits of the state and central 
governments is a revealing exercise. There appears to be considerable serial correlation in 
this relation. When this is corrected for the trend is decisively upwards and is highly 
significant.  In order to estimate the percentage trend rate of growth the estimated 
equation (corrected for serial correlation) for the log of the combined fiscal deficits of the 
central and state governments is reported below:  
Log GFD =  1.7528                  +          0.024162 Time 
              10.6842[.000]                        2.6657[.013] 
R-Squared = 0 .79564   R-Bar-Squared  = 0.77992 
S.E. of Regression = 0.13209   F-stat.    F(  2,  26) = 50.6125[.000] 
Akaike Info. Criterion =  15.7118   Schwarz Bayesian Criterion = 13.6608 
 DW-statistic = 1.8592 
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GFD is gross fiscal deficit of the central and state governments. Figures below a 
coefficient denote the corresponding t values with levels of significance in within 
adjacent square brackets.  The time period covered by the estimation is 1970-98. This 
shows that there is a tendency for GFD to grow12 by about 2.4% per year, on average. 
This is highly significant13.   
 India’s performance with respect to external debt has not been very comforting 
either14. As Table 2 indicates, as of December 1998 India was the ninth most externally 
indebted country in the world.  
    Table 2 
External Debt: India in Comparison with Other Major Debtors 
Country Total 
External Debt 
(US$ billion)  
Debt 
to 
GNP 
(%) 
Debt 
Service 
to 
Exports 
of 
Goods 
and 
Services 
(%) 
Short 
term 
to 
Total 
Debt 
PV 
of 
Total 
Debt 
PV to 
exports  
Of 
goods 
and 
services  
(%) 
PV 
to 
GNP 
Indebtedness 
Classification 
Brazil 232.0 31 354 11 119.9 347 28 Severe 
Russia 183.6 69 207 10 165.2 166 45 Moderate 
Mexico 160.0 42 110 17 155.7 121 44 Less 
China 154.6 16 72 18 135.0 67 15 Less 
Indonesia 147.5 173 254 14 144.7 238 84  Severe 
Argentina  144.1 50 388 22 150.5 424 53 Severe 
Korea 139.1 44 87 20 135.1 83 31 Less 
Turkey 102.1 50 151 27 100.4 176 52 Moderate 
India 98.2 23 144 4 84.3 147 20 Moderate 
Thailand 86.2 77 125 27 85.3 116 58 Moderate 
Philippines 47.8 70 109 15 45.3 102 57 Moderate  
Poland  47.7 31 101 13 44.0 103 30 Less 
Malaysia 44.8 65 62 19 47.3 54 55 Moderate 
                                                               
12 As I have argued elsewhere (Jha (2001)) even this deficit is an underestimate. For instance, this deficit 
ignores the deficit on the “oil pool account” which by itself stood at 0.5% of GDP on March 1, 2001.  
13 The monetised deficit has a tendency to fall over this time period.  
14 As I have argued in Jha (2001) the current account deficit of India does not show a tendency to converge 
to a well-defined limit.   
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Venezuela  37.0 40 173 7 37.7 150 46 Moderate 
Chile 36.3 48 181 21 36.8 179 53 Moderate 
Indebtedness  
Benchmark  
Severe: either 
PV/XGS>220 or 
PV/GNP >80 
Moderate: either 
132³PV/XGS³220 or 
48³PV/GNP³80 
Less:  
PV/XGS<132 and 
PV/GNP < 48 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2000 
 The composition of India’s external debt is elaborated in Table 3. This shows the 
low proportion of short-term debt to total debt and underscores the prudence that Indian 
policy makers have traditionally exercised in the area of external debt.  Also notable is 
the fact that loans available on concessional terms have declined significantly over time.  
Table 3 
India’s External Debt Outstanding   (US$ billion) 
 
Categories                                        End March                                      End Sep     
                                                                                                                                            
1991      1992      1995     1996      1998      1999    2000P    2000P 
Long term 
Debt 
75.26 78.22 94.74 88.70 88.49 93.29 94.40 93.36 
 
Short term 
debt 
8.54 7.07 4.27 5.03 5.04 4.39 4.04 4.50 
Total Debt 83.80 85.29 99.01 93.73 93.53 97.68 98.44 97.86 
External 
Debt – Key 
Indicators 
                                       (Ratios as percent) 
Total 
External 
Debt to GDP 
28.7 38.7 30.8 27.0 24.3 23.6 21.9 20.7 
Short-term 
to Total Debt 
10.2 8.3 4.3 5.4 5.4 4.5 4.1 4.6 
Short-term 
debt to 
Foreign 
Currency 
Assets 
382.1 125.6 20.5 29.5 19.4 14.9 11.5 13.8 
Concessional 
Debt to total 
Debt 
45.9 44.8 45.3 44.7 39.5 38.1 38.5 37.5 
 20 
P: Provisional 
Source: Economic Survey, Government of India, February 2001 
 
The overall picture then that emerges is one where there is considerable fiscal 
stress at all levels of government. Expenditures need to be harmonized and rationalized 
but the overwhelming need is to increase the tax/GDP ratio.  
IV. Rectifying the Problem of Unproductive Public Investment  
The second reason put forward in this paper for the inadequate growth performance of the 
Indian economy is the poor productivity of public expenditure. Although several issues 
are obviously involved here I will concentrate on two of these.  
The first order of business has to be the targeting of public expenditure. From 
food subsidies to public production of intermediate and capital goods, there is 
considerable evidence of mistargeting of expenditures. Several authors, e.g. Jha et. al. 
(1999b) have commented on the mistargeting of major subsidy items such as food 
subsidies. The mistargeting of public expenditures in the design of anti poverty programs 
has been well documented by Gaiha (2000) and others. The deleterious effects of several 
industrial subsidies have been documented by Jha and Sahni (1993). Thus there is no 
gainsaying the fact that public expenditures in India whether these be at the central or 
state levels, on consumer or capital goods or public services need to be better targeted.  
In addition to the question of targeting is that of proper design of public 
expenditure governance systems.  In this context it is instructive to look at the experience 
of countries that have been able to put together a credible program of such reforms.  
Several OECD economies have been able to put into effect such public governance 
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reforms. In such countries economists, management theorists and politicians set about 
revitalizing the public sector during the 1980s, although there remains an underlying 
tension between the erstwhile control approach and the new approach emphasizing 
accountability.  
Public expenditures are now based on a belief that markets provide a good 
benchmark for performance. Thus there have been attempts to not only withdraw the 
State from areas where the private sector can operate but also to find ways in which the 
market can intrude into areas that have traditionally been the preserve of the public 
sector.  
As a result, there have been fundamental changes in the role of the state, its 
institutional structure and management systems. Six key elements of what has been called 
the New Public Management (NPM) agenda can be identified:  
* Sustained privatization of public enterprise, liberalization and the promotion of non-
governmental service providers and, to some extent, a downsizing of state institutions 
have led to a redefinition of the role of the State. The State is now seen more as a 
facilitator than as a social engineer.  
* Administrative reforms have led to a separation of the policy and implementation 
functions. Creating executive government departments and decentralizing responsibility 
for the management of service delivery to departments closer to users have achieved this.  
* Bureaucratic controls on managers have been considerably reduced. This has afforded 
them greater autonomy in the application of resources and in the recruitment and 
remuneration of staff.  
* Setting out and monitoring performance targets, often through formal agency and 
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personnel performance contracts, have made incentives for government departments and 
personnel consistent with policy goals, and with introducing performance related pay.  
* Competitive pressures are brought upon government departments through compulsory 
tendering, internal markets and benchmarking of performance between service delivery 
departments.  
* Mechanisms have been put in place to ensure feedback from and accountability to the 
public, by creating opportunities for 'exit' (facilitating access to alternative private and 
public providers) and 'voice' (through, for instance, user surveys and the participation of 
representatives on management boards).  
The NPM has entailed a fundamental change in the perceived purpose of public 
expenditure management systems. Whereas traditional administrative approaches 
emphasized expenditure control, in order to ensure compliance with procedures and 
legislatively mandated expenditure policies, as expressed in the annual budget, public 
expenditure management now emphasizes performance. This performance is assessed in 
terms of the goals of macro-economic stabilization and economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness in the use of public funds — the so-called SEEE criteria (Premchand 
(1993)).  
Achievement of these goals requires having a broad managerial perspective, in 
which financial resources are jointly managed with other key resources as personnel and 
information, plans and decisions are resource-constrained rather than simply needs based 
and performance assessment contributes to planning and decision-making.  
NPM also implies a wider institutional scope than has traditionally been the case, 
extending beyond the core functions of the ministry of finance to include expenditure 
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management at the departmental level, down to the point where citizens access public 
services. Concurrently, public expenditure management has also moved upstream, 
recognizing that policy decisions are expenditure decisions and that system performance 
can only be assessed in relation to policy goals.  
In consonance with the focus on performance, public expenditure management 
systems are viewed as key instruments of governance. This requires that public 
expenditure management systems are not only transparent and accountable to the 
legislature, but also involve citizens in decision-making. Partly as a result of the abject 
failure of government to provide quality public services, since the 1980s LDCs, and India 
in particular, have seen a rapid expansion in the number of private sector and non-
governmental organizations involved in the provision of, formerly, 'public' services.  
It is now common to find household spending on education and health exceeding State 
expenditures, even where governments claim to offer free services. Governments, 
recognizing their reduced capacity to provide services, have facilitated this process. In 
India, state governments have forged partnerships with local NGOs to improve co-
ordination, provide support and ensure standards. International donors have contributed 
to this trend by channeling funds directly to NGOs. However, this process is not a 
structural transformation. By and large, the private sector and non-governmental 
organizations are seen as alternative service providers rather than an alternative 
mechanism for public service delivery, as proposed in NPM. Transforming this 
perception is a challenge to be addressed in any meaningful reform of public expenditure 
in India. 
IV. Conclusions 
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This paper has outlined some pressing aspects of the research agenda that appear 
important at the beginning of the new millennium.  The tax reforms program in India is 
considerably behind schedule. Fiscal imbalance is distorting central and state government 
expenditure patterns and impacting on growth.  The basic factor causing this was 
identified as the low tax/GDP ratio in the Indian economy. It was argued that tax reform 
measures would improve the allocation of resources, thereby improving growth prospects 
and increasing the tax base and collections. These higher tax collections would ease the 
fiscal pressure on state and central governments thereby enabling them to undertake 
much needed expenditures of a capital nature as well as for poverty alleviation.  
 The paper has further argued that the rapid development of e-commerce while 
inevitable and welcome in its own right, has the potential of eroding the tax base of state 
governments. Given the anticipated large growth in e-commerce this problem is 
potentially of a serious nature and must be planned for. It was argued that lower levels of 
government would find it hard to levy sales taxes and hence more and more tax authority 
would have to be vested with the central government.  Since decentralization of public 
expenditures would continue to be attractive, the role of fiscal transfers from the central 
to state governments is likely to become far more important in the future. This, then, 
becomes another critical area for policy research.  
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